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Abstract 
 
Farmers  in  the  EU  do  not  trade  greenhouse  gases  under  the  Kyoto 
agreement. This is an empirical puzzle. Should farmers participate in the EU 
Emission Trading System (ETS) for greenhouse gases (GHG)? Our overall 
answer is  yes. First, farmers may harvest private net gains because of i) 
relatively low marginal reduction costs, especially within organic farming; 
ii)  the  avoidance  of  future  losses  in  productivity  as  a  victim  of  climate 
change; and iii) the possibility of receiving a favourable allocation system, 
such  as  grandfathering  or  a  list  of  projects  that  release  free  allowances. 
Second, market  consequences in terms of the effect on permit price and 
technology are overall positive, yielding a promising future for the inclusion 
of agriculture in the EU ETS. Finally, we propose a scheme for including 
the  farming  practices  in  the  EU  ETS  that  reduces  the  uncertainty  from 
measuring emission reduction in this sector.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The EU has committed itself to an ambitious 20 % reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) by 2020 
compared to the 1990 emissions level. One important tool to achieve this target level is emission 
trading. Thus, the EU launched the world’s first Emission Trading System (ETS) for GHG on January 
1 2005 as part of the efforts to comply with the target levels in the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
ETS is a unique innovation in modern environmental regulation, which has been transferred to the EU 
based on successful American experiences (Svendsen, 1998). In the EU ETS, the ownership of one 
permit or ‘allowance’ gives the right to emit 1 ton of CO2 equivalents. Once the allowance has been 
used to show compliance in a given year, it will be withdrawn from the market. As long as the 
allowances have not been used to show compliance, they stay in circulation, and all allowances are 
identical regardless what year they have been issued. A market for trade with carbon permits is an 
ingenious way to reach the desired target level – the cap and trade ensures that there is an upper limit 
for total emission and that GHG reduction in terms of carbon equivalents takes place at the cheapest 
and most cost-effective facility (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005). 
 
The EU ETS means that trade of GHG allowances (as translated into CO2 equivalents) can take 
place between firms in different countries. Almost half of total CO2 emission in the EU is covered 
by the market, including more than 10 000 installations (Commission, 2008). 
 
There are numerous ways to reduce GHG, e.g. via wind turbines, solar and wave power, bio fuels, 
energy efficiency measures and – a more recent method – a change in farming techniques. Farmers, 
however, do not trade GHG under the Kyoto agreement. Why not? We suggest that they should. To 
our knowledge, this idea has not yet been launched in the literature. A gap exists. This in spite of 
the  fact that the  United States  heavily advocated the inclusion of change in  land-use practices 
during the climate negotiations in The Hague, year 2000 (Svendsen, 2003). Our research question is 
therefore: Should farmers participate in the EU ETS? 
 
Much uncertainty is involved in the measurement of emission of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N2O) from farming. This has so far been seen as an obstacle to the inclusion of the farming sector 
in the EU ETS (Monni et al., 2007). There are reasons to believe that some of the uncertainties can 3 
 
be effectively reduced with new knowledge (see Olesen, Fog and Svendsen 2010), and moreover, in 
the  end  of  this  paper,  we  propose  a  framework  that  can  circumvent  much  of  the  remaining 
uncertainty and pave the way for including the farming industry in the EU ETS.  
 
We answer our research question in the following way: First, we focus on private gains for farmers 
from participating. If potential private net  gains exist, attracting both  conventional and organic 
farmers  to  the  system  will  be  politically  more  feasible  (Section  2).  Next,  we  focus  on  market 
consequences. What happens to the market in terms of changes in the permit price (Section 3) and 
technology  (Section  4)  when  this  new  sector  is  included?  One  important  problem  regarding 
agriculture is the measurement problem. Estimating GHG emissions is higly problematic since they 
are diffuse non-point sources.  Therefore, Section 5 proposes a scheme that takes  care of these 
problems. Finally, Section 6 offers the conclusion. 
 
 
2. Private gains 
 
The main GHG emitters in the EU-27 are listed below in Table 1. As seen, agriculture is a significant 
source of GHG emissions, being responsible for 9.2 % of total GHG emissions in 2005 (Copa-
Cogeca, 2008). 
 
TABLE 1 APP. HERE. 
 
Table 1 shows that Public Electricity and Heating Production is the greatest GHG emitter in the EU 
with 27.8 % of total emissions. Transport is second (19.5 %) and manufacturing/construction third 
(12.7 %). Agriculture ranks number four (9.2 %). 
 
At the moment, three of the great GHG emitters are not covered by the EU ETS, namely 2. Transport, 
4. Agriculture and 6. Residential. Thus, while the debate on GHG has mainly focused on the energy, 
industrial, and residential sectors and households, only very limited attention has been paid to the 
significant potential to limit GHG emissions in the agricultural sector in spite of the fact that it 
emits about one tenth of total GHG emissions in the EU-27. 
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Sectors differ across countries according to their ability to reduce GHG. East European countries, 
for example, have plenty of opportunity to close inefficient state monopolies and thereby obtain 
easy reductions. In contrast, countries like Denmark and Germany are already energy-efficient and 
do not have the same ‘low-hanging fruit’-possibilities to reduce GHG as businesses in countries 
with less efficient industries. Actually, Denmark’s situation has worsened by the fact that 1990, the 
base year for the free allocation of permits (assigned amounts units) was a ‘wet’ year in the sense 
that  it  rained  a  great  deal  in  Scandinavia.  Denmark,  therefore,  imported  large  amounts  of 
hydropower from Norway and Sweden that year, and its own fossil-based electricity production 
consequently remained at a modest level. In other words, Denmark’s GHG permit allocation is 
lower than it would have been in a normal production year. 
 
2.1 Low-hanging fruits 
 
Agriculture mainly emits methane and nitrous oxide besides carbon dioxide. The GHG emissions 
profile of agriculture, however, is fundamentally different to that of other sectors like industry, 
households and transport, as it is dominated by methane and nitrous oxide. Methane arises from 
enteric fermentation by ruminant animals and from manure, while the application of organic and 
inorganic  fertilisers to  soil can produce nitrous oxide. These are inherently variable, biological 
processes (Copa-Cogeca, 2008). 
 
A huge potential for relatively cheap GHG reductions in agricultural ecosystems appears to exist. 
Picking  the  ‘low-hanging  fruits’  implies  relatively  low  marginal  reduction  costs  (MRC).  For 
example,  improved  cropland  management  (including  nutrient  management,  tillage/residue 
management and water management), improved grazing land management (e.g. grazing intensity, 
nutrient  management)  and  the  restoration  of  degraded  soils.  Also  sink  enhancement  (carbon 
sequestration),  low  energy  production  facilities,  biofuels  (also  for  own  use),  improvements  in 
efficiency of agricultural productivity and the minimization of transportation distance are important 
options. The mitigation potential of agriculture is estimated to reach 5.5-6 Gt. of CO2 equivalents 
per  year  by  2030.  This  potential  is  enormous  relative  to  the  emissions  of  agriculture,  which 
represent 13.5 % of global anthropogenic GHG. 89 % of this potential can be accounted for by soil 
carbon sequestration; 70 % of the total mitigation potential can be realized in developing countries. 
Furthermore, significant benefits associated with soil organic carbon storage make sustainable land 5 
 
management a solution to the interrelated issues of poverty, resilience and sustainable development 
(IFAP, 2009). ‘Over the next decades,  adaptation will need to  go beyond mere adjustments of 
current practice’ (Commission, 2009).  
 
Organic  farming,  in  particular,  is  interesting  with  respect  to  the  empirical  puzzle.  First,  organic 
farming is likely to stabilize productivity because it is more resilient to climate change because of 
efficient  nutrient  cycles  and  soil  management,  and  a  tendency  to  promote  higher  biodiversity. 
Because organic farming preserves soil fertility and maintains, or even increases, organic matter in 
soils, this farming technique is in a good position to maintain productivity in the event of drought, 
irregular  rainfall  events  with  floods,  and  rising  temperatures.  Soils  under  organic  management 
retain  significantly  more  rainwater  thanks  to  the  ‘sponge  properties’  of  organic  matter  (FIBL, 
2006). 
 
Second, research conducted over the last decade also indicates that organic farming production 
methods may have an even higher potential to reduce GHG emissions than conventional farming. 
To a large extent, this difference in emissions is caused by the non-use of chemical fertilizers. When 
emission reduction is measured per hectare, the reduction potential appears to be very impressing. 
Fliessbach (2007) estimates that GHG emissions from organic farming systems are 35-37 % less per 
hectare compared to organic farming, but when emission reduction is measured on the basis of 
production output, emissions reductions are significantly lower as a result of lower yields in organic 
farming. Nevertheless, organic farming still has significant potential for GHG emissions in the 
arable sector, while the potential is more modest in the livestock sector and negative for vegetables 
(Halberg, 2008). Furthermore, based upon Danish data, Dalgaard et al. (2002) and Dalgaard et al. 
(2003) find that the extent to which emissions decrease depends on the way in which livestock 
production is adjusted to lower crop yields. If livestock production is upheld at pre-conversion level 
and fodder is imported to compensate for lower crops yields, the decrease in GHG emissions are 
significantly lower compared with a situation in which livestock production is adjusted to lower 
crop yield. 
 
 
2.2 A victim of climate change 
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Furthermore,  agricultural  productivity  may  be  affected  by  climate  change  as  relatively  small 
changes in the climate can have significant impact on agricultural productivity. For instance, current 
differences in crop productivity between northern and southern Europe are likely to increase under 
climate  change.  Exceeding  crop-specific  high  temperature  thresholds  are  likely  to  result  in  a 
significantly higher risk of crop failure in parts of Southern Europe, while Northern Europe may be 
able to grow a wider range of crops than is currently possible because of a warmer and longer 
growing season. Therefore, crops which are presently grown throughout Europe experience more 
positive  impacts  in  Northern  Europe  compared  with  Nouthern  Europe  (Commission,  1996). 
Recently, the Commission has stated, that: ‘In the long run, climatic pressures may lead to further 
marginalization of agriculture or even to the abandonment of agricultural land in parts of the EU’ 
(Commission, 2009).  
 
 
2.3 Grandfathering 
 
In order to make the system politically attractive to farmers, plentiful permits could be allocated to 
them initially, as has been done in the first phase for other sources. Farmers would then have the 
possibility to obtain a clear economic net gain from participation in the EU ETS. What policy 
instrument  would  an  economically  rational  grouping  prefer?  One  rational  choice  could  be  the 
grandfathered  permit  trading  model,  i.e.  initial  free  distribution  of  historical  emission  rights 
(Tietenberg, 2000). This is the distribution rule applied in practice so far in the United States and in 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The distribution rule of grandfathering consists in a free transfer of the property rights to emission 
rights to polluters. The idea is exemplified in the following way: If a firm emitted 100 tons of 
carbon equivalents in 1990 and is ‘grandfathered’ its 1990 level, this firm will receive 100 carbon 
permits, each permit entitling it to emit one ton of carbon equivalents. If its carbon emission is cut 
by 5 % in 2000 by regulators, the firm’s permit holding will be devalued to 95 permits for 2000. In 
this respect, the use of grandfathering corresponds to the use of standards (Command-And-Control). 
Grandfathering maintains the status quo. The only difference between standards and permit trading 
is the shift in property rights from public authorities to the polluter. Under permit trading, permits 
would now be transferable, in contrast to standards in which permits are non-transferable. In this 7 
 
way, permit  trading  may  be politically  attractive to  producers because  it offers them historical 
emission rights freely when based on grandfathering (Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 2001). 
 
Grandfathering provides rent to existing firms, as opposed to new firms that have to buy their way 
into the market. So, the winners are all existing firms (who obtain their permits at no cost) whereas 
the losers are future firms (who have to buy all their permits from existing firms). As the future 
losers are not represented in the political arena, lobbies representing existing firms will dominate 
the political decision-making process in their favour (Svendsen, 1998). 
 
The EU ETS is (so far) divided into three phases:  
•  Phase 1: 1.1.2005-31.12.2007  
•  Phase 2: 1.1.2008-31.12.2012 (The Kyoto phase)  
•  Phase 3: 1.1.2012-31.12.2020 (The post-Kyoto phase)  
 
Allocation  of  allowances  in  the  first  and  second  phase:  The  member  states  establish  national 
allocation plans (NAP) in which the number of allowances for each individual country is defined. 
These NAPs must be approved by the EU, and must fulfil certain criteria, most importantly that the 
total quantity issued is in line with the Kyoto target. In principle, anyone is allowed to trade in this 
market. Trade can take place via a broker who matches buyers and sellers or via a spot market at 
one of Europe’s climate exchanges. 
 
 
So far, the initial allocation rule has been grandfathering. The EU, however, plans to introduce 
auctioning in the third phase in order to cost-effectively achieve its overall 20 % reduction target 
level by 2020 (compared to the 1990 emissions level). This target level is increased to 30 % if other 
industrialized countries make comparable efforts.  
 
In the words of the EU, the Goal beyond 2012 is to strengthen, expand and improve climate change 
initiatives (Commission, 2008). The objectives of the third phase (not approved by the EU yet) are 
to be more cost-effective and more predictable (which has been a problem in earlier phases because 
of the NAPs). The main changes are as follows (Commission, 2008):  
•  A decrease along a linear trend in the annual cap  
•  A change to an auctioned system  8 
 
•  The  right  to  auction  allowances  in  part  allocated  from  relatively  rich  to  relatively  poor 
countries  
•  The introduction of new installations and the exclusion of some smaller installations  
 
There is a strong need to consider more carefully how to integrate farmers into the objectives of the 
third phase. Auctioning without compensation is probably not a politically feasible solution. A more 
‘soft’ start involving some kind of grandfathering is likely to be more successful. 
 
 
3. New sources and permit price 
 
This section provides a simple graphical presentation of the consequences of including additional 
sources in an existing ETS. In the ETS, supply and demand determine market price. Note, however, 
that this not an ordinary market since a source may be either a demander or a supplier, depending 
on the market price compared to the shadow price of the permit allocation for this source.  
 
FIGURE 1 APP. HERE 
 
Let      be the permit price in the ETS. From an ordinary marginal emissions reduction costs curve 
(MRC), it is possible to derive the individual firm’s demand and supply for permits, see Figure 1. 
Here, firm   initially has an emission level of   . It receives a number of permits given by     . 
Therefore, without any trading, the reduction target for this firm is      with a resulting shadow value 
of the firm’s reduction target, given by        .  If                 then the firm sells permits, and if 
                the firm buys permits. From Figure 1, it is easy to derive the supply and demand 
function for this firm, which is done in Figure 2. Whether a firm is a buyer or a seller depends on 
the price in the market relative to the shadow price of the reduction constraint for the firm        . 
The maximum demand for the firm is     , which is the amount that the firm needs to reduce. By 
buying      permits, it will not have to reduce any. In the same fashion,      is the largest number of 
permits that the firm is able to sell. If it reduces all its emissions, it can sell all the received permits 
from the regulator. 
 
FIGURE 2 APP. HERE. 9 
 
 
Given that the firms (sources) have sufficiently dissimilar marginal reduction costs (   s), we 
reach an ordinary market supply and demand by adding up the sources’ individual   and   curves, 
as seen in Figure 3.  
 
FIGURE 3 APP. HERE. 
 
Note that the market equilibrium depends on the initial allocation (and number) of permits, since 
both the demand and the supply functions are functions of     (as should be clear from Figure 2). 
 
Given this set-up, we can now analyse the consequences of including new sources into such a 
market. The overall conclusion is that if the new sources on average have lower     than the 
existing sources, the price in the market tends to fall. If, e.g., agriculture has lower     (or lower 
shadow values), the permit price tends to fall. The implications are that some selling sources turn 
into buying sources. And there will be a transfer of reduction from the original sources to the new 
sources. If, on the other hand, agriculture has higher    , the price in the market tends to increase. 
The implications are then the opposite as before. Some buying sources turn into selling sources. 
And there will be a transfer of reduction from the new sources to the original sources.  
 
 
4. Incentives to develop new technology 
 
In this section, we will look at the likely consequences of including the farming industry in the ETS 
in  terms  of  developing  new  and  cleaner  technology.  What  is  the  property  of  dynamic  cost-
efficiency? An additional reason for using an ETS compared to a non-tradable (standard) solution is 
exactly that the ETS provides larger incentives to develop/apply new, cleaner technologies. To 
show this, we compare the incentives created by these two instruments. Suppose that a firm is 
subject to a non-tradable situation with a reduction target of      . In the ETS, the firm receives 
permits such that it also reduces      without trade. To compare a situation with ETS and a non-
tradable case, let us initially set the permit price such that the firm does not trade at all. This implies 
that the reductions in the two situations are the same when we look at the original technology. To 10 
 
illustrate the difference, see Figure  4. Here,         represents  the original technology, while 
        represents a new and cheaper way of reducing emissions.  
 
An additional benefit from the ETS is that the firm can now reduce more cheaply and therefore has 
an incentive to reduce more and sell the additional permits at the prevailing market price. Thus, as 
shown in Figure 4, the firm reduces           additional units of emissions. The area   is the excess 
benefit compared to the non-tradable situations. In this case, there are two effects. First, the firm 
obtains additional cost savings, and second, it emits less. However, as long as the overall number of 
permits is fixed, the total emission will not be reduced. 
 
FIGURE 4 APP. HERE. 
 
Given that developing new technology is costly, it is more likely that the new, cleaner technology is 
more profitable to develop under the ETS system than under the non-tradable situation. There is a 
caveat to this result. In the above example, the price in the market is assumed constant. But if more 
firms start adopting this new technology, the price in the market will fall, and the gain from the new 
technology will be smaller. In the limiting case, in which all firms would experience the same cost 
reduction from applying the new technology, the situation would be status quo and no additional 
gain would be experienced compared to the standard.  
 
Finally, the inclusion of new sources that reduce the price in the market will lead to a decrease of 
the incentives to develop new technologies. This final point is illustrated in Figure 5. If the price in 
the market falls from    
    to   
   , the cost savings in the ETS compared to the non-tradable 
situation shrinks from area B to area C.  
 
FIGURE 5 APP. HERE. 
In conclusion, lower prices in the ETS provide fewer incentives for development and/or application 
of newer technologies. On the other hand, lower total compliance costs will make implementation 
of more stringent reduction targets less politically controversial. 
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5. A system for including farmers into an ETS 
  
According to EEA (2009), EU farming contributed 9 % to the total EU-15 GHG emissions in 2007, 
whereas nitrous oxide accounted for 5 % and methane for 4 %. The contribution mostly comes from 
cattle (CH4), and direct and indirect soil emission (N2O), and a minor emission from swine (8% of 
the total emission from farming). The uncertainty attached to these measurements is considerable. 
The paper of Monni el al. (2007) in detail describes the great uncertainties related to measuring 
emissions of nitrous oxide and methane. According to their findings, great uncertainty is attached to 
N2O emissions from agricultural soil in particular. Annual emission from EU 15 is app. 190 Tg 
CO2e, but with great uncertainty, with a lower and upper bound of 95 % confidence interval of -100 
to +1000% as a percentage relative to the mean. According to Monni et al. (2007), the reason for 
this is that emission is caused by complex biological processes with various changing parameters. 
 
On the other hand, new research indicates that recent techniques for measurement, based on already 
existing data from both conventional and organic farmers, can reduce uncertainties to some extent 
(see  Olesen,  Fog  and  Svendsen,  2010).  Moreover,  emission  inventories  are  calculated  for  any 
sector, including the farming industry. The IPCC (2006) provides a series of reduction factors that 
are used for this purpose. Applying such an approach to an individual farmer is the centre of the 
scheme we propose here. 
 
In the following, we propose a system that can be used for including the farmers in the ETS, even 
though uncertainty and measurement problems exist.  
As a starting point, farming contains a number of processes, like keeping animals, or producing 
crops. Each of these processes can be subdivided into activities like keeping different animals. 
Finally, for each such activities, different practices exists, like which fodder to give cows. The basic 
idea of this system is that instead of measuring the emission directly, we calculate the (average) 
change in emission from the baseline practice to the new practice. The whole idea of the system is 
that the authorities can in advance specify what practices should be accepted as valid reduction 
measures. (This could be motivated, e.g., by not including practices that are judged to generate 12 
 
uncertain results). We only want to illustrate our idea, therefore we here only focus on changes in 
practices  and  not  on  changes  in  activities  of  processes,  but  this  be  included  without  much 
complication.  
 
Assume a number of farmers,               ,  are chosen to enter an ETS. (A criterion could be to 
only include farmers of a minimum emission level). We have to specify an allocation rule for the 
initial allocation of allowances to the farmers. Call the allocation rule      . As an example, a 
uniform allocation rule        allocates to each farmer   at time   a number of allowances: 
  
            
   
With      , and where     
   is the calculated emission in (the end of) the previous period. If      , 
there is no requirement of net reduction from the sector in this period, while for any      , there is 
a requirement of net reduction from the sector in this period. 
 
Now  let  us  look  at  how  to  calculate  emissions  from  activities  and  practices.  Let  a  number  of 
activities be               . For each such activity, there is a number of practices, indexed by 
             . Each activity practice pair has an emission factor per unit of measurement (E.g., one 
cow fed with fat food has an emission factor of     , while the emission factor of conventional food 
is     ). If a farmer switches from conventional to fat food, the emission reduction per cow per year 
is given by:            . More generally, we call the units    
  (in the above example a cow) and 
activity practice pair the emission factor for    .  
 
Let us now turn attention to reduction projects of farmer  . Such a reduction project in our setting is 
a change in  practice from  a baseline (BL) practice to  a new practice.  We write the change in 
emission per unit activity as            
        . We introduce time as   to indicate that permits are 
valid in a limited period of time. To simplify, assume that farmer   total has              reduction 
projects. 
1Reduction from project    for farmer   is given by   
                 , i.e.to make this 
model work, we need to specify all the  ’s, as this also defines the   ’s and all the    ’s. (Here, we 
                                                       
1 So if a farmer has two activities and for the first changes two practices and for the second 1,      .  13 
 
ignore the case that    
  could also be changed. But this is easily included into the model.). Finally, 
total reduction is given by   
        
     
    . 
 
How many allowances must farmer   hand in at the end of the period? This is calculated in the 
following way, where   
           means the number of allowances that farmer i must hand in to 
the authorities in the end of period t:  
  
               
      
  
So for each type of activity,  , we calculate the reduction due to changed practices (there could be 
more than one practice for an activity, or for subsets of this activity). Subsequently, we sum over 
the reductions for each activity to obtain the total reduction. This sum is then subtracted from the 
emission level of this source at the beginning of the period. This provides the number of allowances 
that the farmer must hand in. If this sum is lower than the initial allocation, the source can sell from 
the remaining allowances. If the sum is larger than the initial allocation (which is possible either 
when       and no reduction undertaken, of      , but emission increased), this source must buy 
additional allowances. In appendix 1, we present an example of how this system works.  
 
TABLE 2 APP. HERE. 
 
Fødevareministeriet (2008) states that the total potential for reducing emissions from farming in 
Denmark is estimated to be 3851 MtCO2e per year, which amounts to 31 % of the emission from 
agriculture and 6 % of the total emission (year 2007). However, incentives to choose new practices 
depend on (net) costs of these new practices and the     . In Table 2, we show the most promising 
practices in terms of size and costs. 
 
There are, however, even more effective ways of reducing emission, which is not included in Table 
2. According to Fødevareministeriet (2008) and Chatskikh et al. (2008), reduced tillage (and direct 
drilling), which are methods that reduce labour and energy efforts, show a great CO2e reduction 
potential. The reductions can mainly be attributed to reduced energy uses, increased storage of CO2 14 
 
in the soil and net changes in the emission of nitrous oxide. The studies conclude that the total 
emissions reduction is app. 370 kg CO2/ha, with approximately 90 % stemming from storage.  
 
At present (May 2010), the price of allowances is app. 13€/tonnes CO2. If comparing this price with 
the reduction costs in Table 2, such a price will, all else equal, only imply minor reductions from 
the farming sector. There are, however, two reasons to expect that this will underestimate the future 
potential for reductions in the farming sector, if it is included in the EU ETS. 
 
The first reason is that in an ETS, as already stressed in the previous section, the participants have 
incentives to find new and/or cheaper ways of implementing these measures, implying that costs of 
the above measures fall. The second reason is that if the third phase will be implemented, the 
allowance price is likely to increase once the number of allowances is reduced.  
 
Finally, we proposed a scheme that may be considered a project-based approach, in which the 
regulator  in  advance  makes  a  list  over  farming  practices  that  can  be  used  as  valid  reduction 
measures in the EU ETS system. This brings about the question of which practices to include? One 
reasonable criterion would be  to only include practices in which the uncertainty is minor. The 
uncertainty here could relate to measurement uncertainty or simply lack of understanding of the 
underlying biological/chemical processes. As new research reduces such types of uncertainty or 
new methods that contain less uncertainty are developed, the list of acceptable practices can be 
expanded.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The EU is facing a great challenge under the Kyoto Protocol in its ambitious efforts to achieve a 20 
% GHG reduction from 1990 to 2020. Crucially, the participation of farmers could be one extra 
important tool for the European Union to succeed. Should farmers participate in the EU ETS? This 
research question was stimulated by a gap in the literature. Our argument is yes. Farmers should 
join in for two reasons. 
 
The first reason is that farmers may harvest private net gains from participating. Recent surveys 
clearly indicate that farmers face relatively low marginal reduction costs. Low hanging fruits exist 
both within conventional farming and, perhaps, organic farming in particular. Farmers as a group 
may gain significant benefits from GHG trade. Furthermore, farmers may avoid future losses as 
climate change may have a significant economic impact on agriculture in near future. Finally, the 
option of grandfathering rather than auctioning would be the first step to attract farmers to the 
system. 
 
The second reason why farmers should participate in the EU ETS is that the market consequences in 
terms of the effect on permit price and technology are overall positive. Regarding the effects on the 
price of allowances, it is not likely that the inclusion of the farming industry will have a significant 
influence on the price because of its relatively small size compared to the overall emissions. It will, 
however,  imply  a  larger  volume  of  trading,  resulting  in  cost-efficiency  gains.  Incentives  to 
development and/or implementation of new and cleaner technologies are, however, also largely 
affected by expectations of future allowance prices. If the third phase is implemented as proposed, 
an  increase  in  the  allowance  price  is  to  be  expected,  which  will  generally  spur  incentives  for 
technology improvements. This is also likely for the farming industry, making more and more new 
practices  attractive.  Note  that  being  in  an  ETS  provides  continuous  incentives  to  make  new 
practices cheaper or more effective, even if the price of allowances remains constant (compared to 
ordinary CAC regulation). Therefore, the estimates of present costs of reductions for the various 
measures (like the one presented in table 2) typically exaggerate costs for applying these measures 
in the future.     16 
 
 
Finally, in this paper, we have proposed a system that makes it possible to overcome some of the 
potential shortcomings from including farmers into the EU ETS, which have been put forward. First 
and  foremost,  farmers  would  increase  measurement  problems  and  uncertainty  significantly  as 
emissions  are  a  non-point  source.  Our  system  is  framed  as  a  project-based  system.  Thus,  it 
resembles, e.g., a joint implementation arrangement. A project in this system is an approved way of 
reducing emissions, either by introducing a new, less polluting practice or by reducing the polluting 
activity. In this system it is possible to control the uncertainty by only including the least uncertain 
elements. As new and better information is available, new practices can be included, such that the 
system also is flexible. Finally, it still provides the farmers to invest in CO2e reducing activities. In 
this  way,  the  farmers  can  be  included,  without  increasing  the  uncertainty  in  the  EU  TPS 
significantly.   
 
Overall, the inclusion of both conventional and organic farmers in the EU ETS offers a solution 
which meets the interests of farmers and the EU as a whole.  If the challenge of incorporating 
agriculture in the EU ETS can be addressed adequately, indeed, the role of farmers in climate policy 
may become a hot issue during future climate meetings. Crucially, the US would probably be much 
more likely to rejoin the Kyoto agreement, thereby clearing the road for the participation of China 
and India as well. Until now, the US has strongly advocated land-use practices as ‘the missing link’ 
in past climate negotiations. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Example (numbers are totally random). 
Consider a situation with three farmers and two activities. Activity 1 has two possible practices, while 
activity 2 has three practices. So far, all the farmers use the practice that has the highest emission factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assume that F1 uses     instead of     and that F2 uses      instead of    . F3 does not change practice over 
the period.  
 
Calculate the initial emissions: 
  
                              
  
                              
  
                              
 
sum                                = 106 
 
Calculation of net reductions:  
  
                                 
  
                                                
  
                                 
 
sum                                        = 20 
 
Let           
The first period allocation of allowances is given by:  
 
  
          
                     
  
          
                     
  
          
                    
 
    (Baseline)  0.7 
      0.5 
    (Baseline)  0.4 
      0.5 
      0.2 
Farmer  U1  U2 
F1  30  40 
F2  20  50 
F3  10  70 20 
 
sum                                = 95.4 
 
The number of allowances to hand in and the surplus allowances: 
 
                
      
                 
Surplus allowances for farmer 1:   
                                  
 
                
      
        
Surplus allowances for farmer 2:   
                                   
 
                
      
                  
Surplus allowances for farmer 3:   
                                  
 
The total surplus of allowances is: 7.5 
 
 
Figure 1: Marginal reduction curve 
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Figure 2: Individual firms’ demand and supply for permits  
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Figure 3: The market for permits  
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
Permits 
      
       
          
               
        Permit price 23 
 
Figure 4: A selling firm 
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Figure 5: Cost reduction of new technology: Comparing ETS with a standard. 
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Figure 6: Lowering of price in the ETS reduces incentives to develop new technology 
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Table 1: GHG emissions from different sectors in the EU-27, 2007. 
 
Sector  % 
1. Public Electricity and Heat Production  27.8 
2. Transport  19.5 
3. Manufacturing Industries and Construction  12.7 
4. Agriculture  9.2 
4. Industrial Processes  8.5 
6. Residential  8.5 
7. Commercial/Institutional  3.3 
8. Waste  2.8 
9. Petroleum Refining  2.7 
10. Fugitive Emissions from Fuels  1.7 
1.1. Agriculture/Forestry/Fisheries  1.5 
12. Manufacture of Solid Fuels and Other Energy Industries  1.4 
13. Solvent and Other Product Use  0.2 
14. Other (Not elsewhere specified)  0.2 
Total  100.0 
 
Source: EEA (2010) 
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Table 2: Potential reduction measures, their size and costs 
 
Type of measure  Reduction potential
1 
(Denmark) 
Reduction cost
2 
(€/tonnes CO2e) 
Bioenergy 
Straw for energy production                      298  15 
Manure management  807  90 
Willow chips  1270  Sandy soil: 55 
Clay soil: 92 
Energy maize  531  179 
Domestic animals 
 
Adding fat in cattle feed 
above standard 
298  43 
Nitrification inhibitor  272  191 
Cropland management  
  
Summer catch crops  280  n.a. 
Set-aside of agricultural area 
on lowland 
295 
 
29 
Grassland 
 
247  911 
Agroforestry 
 
321  911 
Source:  Danish  ministry  of  Food,  Farming  and  Fisheries  (Fødevareministeriet,  2008  [Our 
translation]).  Note:  Numbers  do  not  include  any  reduction  of  domestic  animals  since  it  is 
assumed that a reduction in one country region will increase the number of animals elsewhere. 
1 Estimated potential for reduction of GHG from farming until 2020. 1000 ton CO2e per year.  
2  Numbers  are  costs  to  the  farmers  of  implementing  the  measure.  C-storage  in  soil  is  not 
included.  
 